Cross-sector competition in the information and communications technology sectors (ICT sectors) constitutes a key strategic challenge for telecommunications companies. Due to increasing convergence, value creation is resulting in a greater degree of interaction. The diversification potential of telecommunications businesses is therefore changing with respect to associated ICT sectors, such as hardware, software and media. This article analyses cross-sector competition in the telecommunications industry on the basis of the diversification activities of ICT companies. A concentration of competitive interdependence in the ICT sectors is demonstrated using a cluster analysis of 34,142 companies. The cross-sector activities of telecommunications companies are investigated using contingency and dependency analyses, and the diversification-related competition in the telecommunications sector is also analysed. With regard to the telecommunications sector, particularly high level cross-sector competition with the media industry is identified, as well as strong diversification activities in the software sector. The results are used to derive the potentials and risks that have a significant bearing on the structure of the cross-sector competitive environment of telecommunications companies.
Opening text:
The basic framework conditions of the cross-sector competitive environment for telecommunications companies are changing as a result of convergence. Increasing integration into the value creation of ICT companies is affecting the potentials and risks of diversification activities in the telecommunications sector. Cross-sector competition in the ICT sector is analysed on the basis of a literature study and a quantitative evaluation. With regard to telecommunications companies, high level cross-sector competition with the media sector is identified in particular, in addition to strong diversification activities in the software sector. The results are used to derive the potentials and risks that have a significant bearing on the structure of the cross-sector competitive environment of telecommunications companies.
Introduction
The competitive environment of a company is significantly shaped by the sector to which it belongs (Porter (1980, pg.5) , that is, by the group of companies that produce closely-related substitutes. The commercial environment of telecommunications companies (TCCs) is also affected considerably by cross-sector competitive and cooperative relationships in the formerly mostly independent software, hardware, media and telecommunications sectors. These so-called convergence phenomena (Stieglitz 2003, pg. 25; Katz 1996 Katz , pg. 1079 Katz -1095 continue to represent a major strategic challenge for the TCCs. Internet telephony is an obvious, contemporary example. Whilst in the past speech services were predominantly offered by TCCs on the basis of circuit switching technology, software and internet providers are now in a position to address this market. The result of this convergence is a greater degree of interaction between the companies of the relevant sectors with regard to the adding of value (Zerdick et al. 2000, pg. 130-135) . The diversification activities of a company determine the sectors in which it is competitively active and also indicate whether competitive advantages can be generated by integrating different product-specific, value-creating processes (Ansoff 1966, pg. 149-135; Porter 1985, pg. 317-363) .
Articles published on cross-sector competition in the information and communications technology sectors (ICT sectors) predominantly use qualitative and argument-based deductive methodologies to demonstrate the consequences of increasing integration in the value creation activities of ICT companies and to determine the strategic implications for companies. As suggested in articles by Mayring (2001) and by Srnka and Koeszegi (2007) , we make use of quantitative analysis procedures to generalise the already available qualitative results and broaden the investigation (generalisation model). By means of an examination of the hypotheses used (and to an extent contradictorily discussed) by the quoted authors, our work tests the available qualitative descriptions of cross-sector competition in the telecommunications industry. Our findings show that the results of qualitative studies can only be partially generalised and lead to the company strategic implications outlined in Section 4.
2 Cross-sector competition in the telecommunications industry
Basic objectives regarding cross-sector competition
Diversification means the widening of corporate activities to encompass new products and/or markets (Schuele 1992, pg.8) . In the context of this work, three different types of diversification are considered (Meffert 2000, pg. 245-246; Ansoff 1966, pg. 152) : horizontal, vertical and also lateral diversification.
Under horizontal diversification, the existing product programme is extended around related products, the manufacture or marketing of which is able to make use of already available resources, thus allowing synergies to be harnessed. The addressing of marketing and/or technologically-linked product market areas is often referred to as concentric diversification although this, as Meffert (2000, pg.245-246) has shown, can be regarded as a subset of horizontal diversification. Vertical diversification is characterised by an increase in the depth of a programme. With regard to lateral diversification (also referred to as conglomerate diversification), companies enter new product and market areas with no related links to their previous business and thereby become involved in very diverse fields of commercial activity.
With regard to diversification objectives, there are four that are given particular emphasis (Schuele 1992, pg. 10-11; Lubatkin 1983, pg. 219) . These objectives are growth (1), competitiveness (2), profit (3), and risk reduction (4). In cases where company markets become unattractive due to saturation or high levels of competitive intensity, diversification may be used in an attempt to reverse falling turnover and profits and allow new growth potential to be tapped (1). Diversification can help companies to enhance their competitive capacity (2). With horizontal diversification, for example, advantageous wholesale and retail pricing levels can be achieved due to economies of scale (Lubatkin 1983, pg. 219) . Regarding vertical diversification, the independence of upstream and downstream competitive processes is reduced and a company's relative competitive position is, therefore, increased (Ehrmann 1999, pg. 44) . Diversification can also be linked to the objective of increasing profit (3). If, in relation to separate production, the joint production of the diversified product programme promises increased efficiency based on economies of scope or scale, synergies can be realised and resource profitability increased (Schuele 1992, pg. 15) . With horizontal diversification, according to Lubatkin (1983, pg. 220), synergies can be realised by means of accessing production and marketing resources and due to the existence of learning/experience curve effects. Vertical diversification can give rise to objective, temporal and spatial linkage effects (Lindstaedt 2006, pg. 65) . Diversification can also be used to eliminate non-systematic risks (4) (Schuele 1992, pg.16). Porter (1985, pg. 317-363) refers to value chain linkages as the justification for the development of synergies in diversified companies. Tangible linkages lie in the chances of different business units to share value creating activities, since the same consumers, marketing channels, technologies and other factors are needed. Intangible linkages arise due to the transfer of management knowledge between different value chains.
Characteristics of cross-sector competition in the telecommunications industry
The telecommunications sector has been exposed to powerful changes as a result of the deconstruction of established value chains (Li and Whalley 2002, pg. 451-472) . The evaluation of the ICT sector structural analyses in this section provides an overview of value chain linkages and diversification activities in the telecommunications sector. Table 1 summarises the evidence obtained from structural analyses of the ICT sectors in the form of the participating actors and the value creation levels. The core value-creating activities of the TCCs traditionally concentrate on network operation and the provision of data transport services which, for technical reasons, are directly linked to network operation (Dengler 2000, pg. 92-94) . All authors focus their analyses of ICT sectors alongside the telecommunications industry on players from the hardware (components and equipment), software and internet applications and media sectors. The hardware components sector includes the production of materials and components (e.g. semiconductors) required for the manufacturing of hardware equipment (Dengler 2000, pg. 92) . Hardware equipment manufacturers address the market for network equipment (transmission and switching systems) and terminal equipment (Dengler 2000, pg. 93; Maitland 2002, pg. 492-493) . Software and internet application providers are usually further segregated into middleware or platform operators and service providers (Kuo and Yu 2006 , pg. 1347 -1356 Fransman 2007, pg. 32) . Media companies devote themselves to the provision and marketing of text, graphic and multimedia content (Zerdick et al. 2000, pg. 38-268; Wirtz 2006, pg. 671-696) . Some authors (Gerpott 1998, pg. 4-14; Dengler 2000; pg. 92-97; Wirtz 2006, pg. 671-696) include the roles of media, software and internet service providers in the provider of value-added services designation. According to Zerdick et al. (2000, pg. 132-135) , convergence leads to considerable linkage within value adding processes and to competitive strategy interdependencies. This is, however, limited to those sectors named. Other sectors, such as transport, health and social welfare and the energy and water industries are not included in the analyses made by any of the authors, even though ICT also has a major role in these sectors (Muenchner Kreis 2010, pg. 122-127) . Such restrictions are neither based on justifications or empirical evidence provided by the authors and is, therefore, questioned in the context of the present work. The hypothesis of a concentration of structural integration in the ICT sectors can be examined on the basis of company-specific diversification activities. Where there is strong structural integration between two sectors, the products manufactured are offered integrated to a large extent: Gerpott (1998, pg. 216-220) sees the broadening of business activities in the field of multi-media services as an important strategic option for TCCs. He makes a distinction here between communication multi-media services for facilitating the symmetrical interaction of a small number of users (e.g. telemedicine and telelearning) and the distribution multi-media services aimed at disseminating information to a large number of users with feedback options (e.g.
video-on-demand and teleshopping). In addition to the range of value-adding services, Kuo and Yu Some of the authors also include in their structural analyses of the ICT sector the question of whether the core business of the TCCs, network operation and the provision of network-based services, is at all affected by the entry into the telecommunications market of players from other sectors. In respect thereof, Gerpott (1998, pg. 260) identifies significant business potential for TC equipment manufacturers that, due to their high levels of technical expertise in telecommunications network development (system integration), can also gain a foothold in network operation. Furthermore, software and hardware companies can thrive in the telecommunications market, since the capacity and performance of the hardware and software deployed increases both the functionality and cost of TC networks and affects the provision of new services (Gerpott 1998, pg. 258 ). According to Zerdick et al. (2000, pg. of this analysis was to group the sectors with similar association profiles. A hierarchical cluster analysis was carried out with a cluster methodology employing the arithmetic mean of the distances of all objects of the two clusters as the dimension for the distance between the clusters (linkage between the groups) and the quadratic Euclidian distance being used as the distance dimension. In an agglomerated procedure based on the narrowest partition, the two clusters with the smallest distance were merged in each step. The Ellbow criterion (Everitt 1993, pg. 100) was used to determine the optimum cluster number.
Since the value increase of the clustering coefficient assumes a local maximum of between seven and eight clusters, the number of clusters was set to a value of eight. 3 Table 2 shows the allocation of sectors to the eight clusters. The cluster analysis assigns the ICT sectors "hardware components, hardware equipment, software, telecommunications and media" to one cluster (Cluster 1). This shows that the ICT sectors are strongly associated with each other and, simultaneously, weakly associated to other sectors.
Contingency analyses
Hypothesis H2 was examined using contingency analyses (Wickens 1989, pg. 17-50) based on the significant diversification activities pursued by the TCCs in other ICT sectors. It was investigated whether, in respect of their involvement in the other four ICT sectors (focus sectors), companies active in the telecommunications sector differ significantly from other ICT firms. A contingency analysis was carried out for each of the four focus sectors -hardware components, hardware equipment, software and media, as follows: the set of ICT companies with a primary SIC class not allocated to the focus sector were chosen as the population. The primary SIC class of a company is determined by the product with the greatest share of turnover. The companies making up the population were subsequently divided into four disjoint groups, based on their involvement in the telecommunications sector (telecommunications -yes or no) and in the focus sector (focus sector -yes or no). The number of companies in each group was determined and, using this value, a Pearson Χ 2 test was carried out (Wickens 1989, pg. 39-41) and the Cramér contingency coefficient (Cohen 1988, pg. 223-227) calculated. The group strengths and the results of the analysis are shown in Table 3 .
2 The degree of association of all sectors is given in the appendices in Table 8 .
3 Figure 2 in the appendices shows the dependence of Clustering Coefficient on Cluster Number. 
Dependency analysis
A dependency analysis was carried out in order to analyse the diversification activities in the telecommunications sector of companies from external sectors (H3). For the purpose of deciding between the diversification activities of TCCs inside external sectors and those of companies from external sectors inside the telecommunications sector, the companies were assigned to individual sectors solely on the basis of their primary sectors. The assigned sector of the primary SIC class is designated as the primary sector. Directional relationships x a (b) were determined on the basis of this allocation, with these indicating the proportion of firms in a primary sector (a) with secondary activities in another sector (b):
A Prim is the set of all firms having primary sector "a", and B is the set of all firms active in sector "b".
During the analysis, only directional relationships from or to the telecommunications sector were considered. Only directional relationships with values exceeding 5% were subsequently included in the discussion (Figure 1 ).
Two performance indicators were determined: the dependency indicator (d(a,b)) represents the absolute value of the difference between the directional relationships of the two sectors:
d(a,b) = |x a (b) -x b (a)|
A high value indicates a disparity in the diversification-specific potential of the companies in the two sectors (one-sided dependency). The association strength indicator (r(a,b)) shows for two sectors the ratio of companies for which the primary SIC class is allocated to one of the two sectors and for which a further SIC class is allocated to the other sector compared to the entire set of companies having a or b primary sectors. A high value indicates strong association:
A strong and two-sided association exists between the telecommunication and media sectors. The software sector also shows a strong association, though in this case the association is one-sided. The third strongest and somewhat one-sided association is to the hardware equipment sector. In addition, telecommunications companies are very active in holdings and other investment offices and offer general business services such as equipment rental and leasing, or personnel supply services. Since, according to the cluster analysis, these sectors cannot be allocated to the ICT sectors, they are not considered further.
Figure 1: Directional relationships in the telecommunications sector
The concentration of structural linkages to the media, software, hardware equipment, hardware component and telecommunications sectors was confirmed using cluster analysis, since these five sectors are assigned to one cluster and hypothesis H1 is, therefore, confirmed. Competitive strategies of ICT companies are, therefore, concentrated to a significant degree on the ICT sectors. At the time of the assessment, it was also established that ICT-related market convergence effects remained limited to the ICT sectors. The results of the cluster analysis justify focusing the analysis of cross-sector competition in the telecommunications industry on the ICT sectors.
The extent and objectives of TCC diversification activities and the telecommunications-related diversification activities of other ICT companies is discussed below (Table 4) . The contingency analysis reveals a structural integration of the media and telecommunications sectors. Dependency analysis confirms this to be a two-sided relationship. From the diversification theory perspective, profitability increase effects can be achieved with horizontal distribution as a result of economies of scope. These come into being due to the shared use of marketing resources, such as billing relationships or information on consumer preference for the marketing of broadband access and media services to private customers. These types of market resources, often classified under the superordinate term "end customer access", are seen as central to the monetising of media services (Clemons 2009, pg. 15-41; Rams 2001, pg. 1-4) and also play a strategic role in sales of aggregation platforms and portals (Maitland et al. 2002, pg. 492 ). Furthermore, due to market narrowing effects, the competitive position with respect to competing TCCs can be improved by the exclusive marketing of media services (Ehrmann 1999, pg. 44) . On the other hand, media companies -especially those in the radio and television business -have developed their own transmission capacities, since the exclusive use of distribution channels under vertical diversification can significantly strengthen market position with respect to competitors (Gerpott 1998, pg. 259).
The contingency and dependency analyses point to a stronger than average, one-sided association in the telecommunication and software sectors. TCCs develop software-specific competences, since these types of resources, due to convergence effects, may increasingly be regarded as complementary to, or as a substitute for, existing TCC sales. Messerschmitt (1996 Messerschmitt ( , pg. 1167 Messerschmitt ( -1186 has established that, in many cases, telecommunications applications no longer differ from networked computing applications and, therefore, such applications are increasingly realised based on software and programmable terminal equipment. These types of substitution effect are noticeable both in the end customer (e.g. instant messaging versus texting) and the wholesale business (e.g. content distribution versus internet transit). The functionality and cost of the telecommunications networks and the provision of new services are, according to Gerpott (1998, pg. 258) , increasingly dependent on the performance and capacity of the hardware and software deployed. With regard to service provision, software-based invoice processing, personalisation and distribution systems are increasingly being used (Jakopin 2006, pg. 39; Sabat 2002, pg. 521-522; Wulf and Zarnekow 2010, pg. 3-19) . In order to guarantee a significant share in value creation, TCCs are striving to offer differentiated value-added services, in respect of which the provision of software-specific resources is becoming increasingly important (Dengler 2000, pg. 203; Zerdick et al. 2000, pg. 101) . With this rationale, TCC diversification activities are coupled with growth targets. In marketing, economies of scope can be achieved by means of cross-selling, both in the private and business customer segments. In addition, as a result of the shared use of invoice processing systems, user databases and server infrastructures, economies of scope can also be achieved at the technical resource level. It can be concluded from the weak involvement of software companies in the telecommunications sector that, for software companies, the costs of diversification, due to expenses linked with coordination, efficiency losses and reduced flexibility (Porter 1985, pg. 331-335) , outweigh any diversification advantages.
Based on the results of the contingency analysis, the association of the telecommunications and hardware equipment sectors is less pronounced. Despite that, cluster and dependency analyses do show a certain level of significance. In the dependency analysis, it can be seen that the association is weak and one-sided. Based on the high affinity of the necessary resources for hardware equipment production, development of the telecommunications networks (system integration) and network operation, strong linkage effects may be assumed. For this reason, network component manufacturers in particular pursue integration strategies. Due to the binding of TCCs to hardware manufacturer systems, via potential product-product or product-user incompatibility and accompanying investment specifity, strong vendor lock-in effects can develop with hardware equipment being integrated into telecommunications networks (Bastian 2002, pg. 66-76) . In addition to pursuing multi-vendor strategies, TCCs address these difficulties by outsourcing network operation (Chaudhury and Terfloth 2008, pg. 1-7). In the main, terminal equipment and network transport only offer customer added-value when combined. Economies of scope can therefore be achieved by means of integrated marketing.
Standards are mostly used for the integration of terminal equipment and network infrastructure -for configuring the data communication of mobile telephones and TV equipment, for example. In many cases, however, the basic economic and technical conditions existing between the TCC and the terminal equipment provider are directly negotiated as, for example, is the case with Amazon's "Kindle" ebook or the Tollcollect road toll's "On board unit". In the case of non-standard integration, TCCs can make use of linkage effects by integrating data transport and terminal equipment, thereby improving their competitive position in the terminal equipment market. Deutsche Telekom's IP-TV (Telekom Entertain) is an example of the above, with the set-top box being marketed together with the data connection.
In summary, it is determined that TCCs in the media, software and hardware equipment sectors pursue significant diversification activities and that hypothesis H2 can be confirmed in respect of these activities. Regarding the involvement of companies from other ICT sectors in the telecommunications industry, it can be said that firms from the media and hardware equipment sectors have significant involvement but that hypothesis H3 has to be rejected regarding firms from the software and hardware components sectors.
Outlook
This article has looked at the diversification activities and their objectives in relation to the telecommunications sector. Due to the theoretical framework employed and the available data, the results obtained are subject to certain limitations. Cross-sector competition has been discussed in the context of diversification theory. In addition to the diversification objectives discussed in this article, there are other aspects that have not been considered here but which can play a role in cross-sector competition.
Company-specific insourcing and outsourcing barriers (Gerybadze 2005, pg. 457-474; Picot 1991, pg. 349-353) are examples of such aspects.
Despite potentially advantageous diversifications effects, a high degree of diversification can also be detrimental. Porter (1985, pg. 331-335) emphasises that, in addition to coordination costs, there can be unfavourable levels of both efficiency and flexibility. Since the ICT sectors are characterised by high innovation dynamics and weak barriers to entry, any over-high degree of diversification can bring with it serious competitive disadvantages. In relation to vertically integrated TCCs, organisational inflexibility and a lack of customer-specific problem-solving skills are criticised (Gerpott 1998, pg. 13; Maitland et al. 2002, pg. 491) . When presenting the advantages of telecommunications-specific diversification, it is clear that the technical advantages of vertical diversification can be claimed only in the case of a few web-based services such as, for example, IPTV. Whereas the telecommunications market was previously dominated by vertically-integrated companies, value chain disintegration is henceforth predicted. This, due to changes in the competitive environment (such as, for example, more flexible company cooperation), is leading to stronger customer orientation and the increased opening of technical platforms (Dengler 2000, pg. 184; Henneking et al. 2010, pg. 17-21) . Due to the high degree of specialisation involved, the competitive positions of the TCCs are crucially influenced by their cooperative relationships (Zerdick 2000, pg. 177-184) . Economies of scale and scope also play a strategic role (Sabat 2002, pg. 533) . These can be strengthened by horizontal diversification, as shown in the examples of joint marketing and access to technical resources. Although in the context of this work, concentration of competitive interdependence within the ICT sectors has been stated, this has the potential to go beyond the limits of the ICT sectors in the future, due to the increased potential of horizontal diversification. Examples in this respect are the transport sector, health and social welfare and the energy and water supply industries (Muenchner Kreis 2010, pg. 122-127) . Since ICT is gaining increasing influence in these sectors, cross-sector synergies could result.
In summary, stronger vertical concentration and horizontal diversification offer TCCs a multitude of strategic options. Network operation can, for example, be outsourced (Chaudhury and Terfloth 2008, pg. 1-7) or brand, pricing policies and sales can be grouped together in a business model approach, which Dengler (2000, pg. 204) refers to as application and services integration. Furthermore, a focus on the intermediation between end customer and service provider, or on the provision of "infrastructure-as-a-service" services and the operation of ICT infrastructures are possible future options (Kuo and Yu 2006 , pg. 1354 -1355 Henneking et al. 2010, pg. 23-25) .
Since the conclusions reached here regarding the future development of the TCC competitive environment are purely qualitative in nature, further research will be necessary in the analyses accompanying these developments. Here, it will be of particular interest to note in which specific combinations concentration integration and cooperation strategies will bring about commercial success.
Appendices

SIC class and sector allocation
The SIC classes are structured in a four-digit, dendritic hierarchy based on production and marketorientated differentiation criteria. The structure is mainly orientated to generic levels of value-adding and distinguishes, inter alia, the single digit SIC classes of manufacturing, services, wholesale and retail. Since the five ICT sectors do not uniquely assign SIC classes to a higher hierarchy level (1-3) , the authors adopted a four-digit SIC class allocation for the five sectors -hardware equipment, software, telecommunications, hardware components and media. The results of the literature analysis of value creation in the ICT sector was used (Table 1) to identify ICT-specific four-digit SIC classes and for sector allocation. The sector allocations (Table 5) were checked by three independent specialists in order to ensure their completeness and validity. , 2721, 2731, 2741, 4832, 4833, 4841, 7311, 7312, 7313, 7319, 7812, 7819, 7822, 7829 In order to achieve the full allocation of four-digit SIC classes and sectors, the non ICT-specific fourdigit SIC classes were also allocated to sectors when preparing the cluster analysis (Table 6 ). The allocations were then checked by the three independent experts. Allocation was based on the SIC hierarchy. With the objective of keeping sector size deviation to a minimum while also maintaining clear sector separation, SIC classes on the second or third hierarchy levels, as well as the remaining fourdigit SIC classes, were allocated to sectors. The size of a sector is determined by the number of active companies within it. 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 NON CLASSIFIAB-LE NON CLASSIFIABLE 9999
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Figure 2: Clustering coefficient curve 
